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RIOT PREVENTION AND SURVIVAL
RAYMOND M. MOMBOISSE*
THERE ARE NO WORDS to adequately define a riot, for mere wordscan never convey the terror and horror of such an event. Unless
you have seen a city torn, bleeding and in flames, unless you have
faced a wild mob on a rampage, unless you have seen the injured
and the dead, you cannot understand what a riot is. When you have
lived through one, you can never forget it.
Nor is there any effective method of measuring the impact of
a riot. Oh, it is true that statistics can be and are compiled. But
what do they tell us? That so many buildings were looted and
burned, so much property stolen, so many arrested, injured and
killed. These numbers are cold and impersonal. They cannot
depict the human costs-the pain and suffering. They do not reveal
the fear, alienation, distrust and hatred planted and fed by the
rampaging monster. They do not plumb the impact of a com-
munity disrupted, indeed, brought to a standstill. They do not
gauge the loss of confidence and respect for government; for law
and order. These staggering and lingering costs of chaos cannot be
shown in any concrete way. But nevertheless they must be recog-
nized, for only then can we appreciate the full cost of anarchy. Only
then will we realize that if there is anarchy, there is no freedom.
There is no security. Every man is for himself. The law of the
jungle prevails. The strongest prevail; the weak are destroyed.
There is misery and unhappiness for all.
Once we recognize the true cost-both immediate and long
range-it is impossible to ignore those who deliberately incite vio-
lence or to tolerate the stupid attempts to justify, and thus encour-
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age, such savagery. Instead we are driven by one compulsion. It is
to do all that we can to assure it will not happen again.
So let us consider some of the steps that the community must
take. First, it is essential that the community know what the local
conditions are. This demands that there be an effective intelligence
gathering organization which constantly measures the pulse of the
community. In this way the warning flags of impending conflict
may be observed at the earliest possible moment. This requires that
raw intelligence be received from as many sources in the com-
munity as possible. Once received, it is rapidly evaluated and trans-
formed into meaningful conclusions. This must be followed up
with positive action on the part of the community to relieve the
pressure which is generating the discontent.
There must also be liaison established between law enforce-
ment, government officials, religious, social and minority leaders
in the community. By liaison we mean the close cooperation be-
tween these centers of leadership in the community. There must
be an exchange of information between them, a greater understand-
ing of the problems that each faces, and the extending of assistance
whenever possible.
Liaison must be established between the police and those in
private security. Plans must be mutually worked out in advance
for the protection of the commercial and industrial centers which
are potential targets of rioters. Agreement must be reached on
whether or not private guards will be allowed to remain in the riot
areas, and if so, how will they be identified, what will they do, what
protection will be given to them. Plans must be made for safeguard-
ing or removing of large sums of money, jewelry and irreplaceable
documents in the riot area. If defense industries or key utilities are
involved, utmost priority must be given to security for them.
There must be detailed advance planning on the part of the
police for the handling of any potential riot. This requires the
training of police personnel in riot tactics and techniques, as well
as stressing preventive measures which individual officers should
constantly be practicing.
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PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
As far as the actual field control of the riot, the primary
responsibility will rest with the local chief of police or sheriff. It
is he and his men who will be called upon to meet and overcome
the mob and to restore law and order.
At the very outset, we must recognize that in a riot of the
proportions and duration such as we have had within the last few
years, it will be physically impossible to expect one man to com-
mand the field operations throughout the riot. The physical, as
well as the mental, strain upon an individual will be too great.
More than that, if a chief insists upon being the source of all ideas
and upon reviewing all decisions before they are executed, he will
burden himself with such a mass of detail as will create a "bottle-
neck," seriously retarding the handling of disturbances. To avoid
this, he must develop leadership which will encourage initiative in
the force to cope with the problem. He must determine the extent
of the abilities and limitations of the "grass roots" leaders of the
force. Above all, he must avoid surrounding himself with men who
are too lazy-minded or timid to control fear stricken people.
To accomplish this, a chain of command must be established;
general and special staffs must be organized. That plan should
specifically designate the officers who will serve in various positions.
In fact, the plan must establish at least two complete command
structures, for a prolonged emergency cannot be commanded by
one man, no matter how strong or capable. Fatigue will take its
toll. The order should not only provide for two completely dif-
ferent commands to relieve each other at stated times, the plan
must designate deputies for all staff and command positions. Each
deputy will act as the assistant to his immediate superior and will
act for him during temporary absences and replace him in the event
he is unable to perform.
THE COMMAND STRUCTURE
At the top of the command structure is the chief or his desig-
nated representative who commands the resources of the police de-
partment and makes appropriate decisions concerning requests for
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assistance. His basic responsibility is to manage the resources of the
department in such fashion that the field forces at the theater of
operations receive adequate support and the portions of the city
that are not affected by the unusual occurrence continue to receive
police services commensurate with known and anticipated prob-
lems. He will have overall command of all operations, but not
direct tactical command of the field units which will reside in the
field commander. The field commander, or police coordinator as
he is at times designated, exercises control of resources committed
to the unusual occurrence.
The scene commander is the officer directly in command of a
unit in the field. He must have the authority to take whatever
action, in his judgment, is necessary at the time. The duties of the
scene commander shall be assumed by the highest ranking officer
where the disturbance occurs, and he will continue to so act until
replaced by a superior.
The staging area is an area set aside for the accumulation of
men and material resources that will be made available for field
assignment. It is under the command of the reserve force com-
mander or staging officer. All directives to the officers under his
command are relayed through him except as his personnel may
be properly attached to another commander.
To assist the field commander a general staff should be estab-
lished, again operating on the theory that the numerous responsi-
bilities of command can better be performed if they are delegated
to different individuals who can concentrate on one aspect of the
problem. The general staff consists of the field commander, the
executive, personnel, intelligence, logistics, operations and public
information officers.
The executive officer is the principal coordinating agent of
the advisor to the field commander. He supervises and directs the
staff to achieve unity in action. He transmits the decisions of the
commander to the appropriate staff officers for the preparation of
the necessary orders. He should be assisted by a secretary to the
general staff, whose primary responsibility will be to act as the office
manager of the command post.
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The personnel officer supervises the activation of personnel
both from within and without the department so that adequate
manpower is always ready for assignment when needed. He will
also keep the records of the deployment of manpower both in the
field and in the reserve units, so that immediate assignment may be
made. The function of the logistics officer is to provide the neces-
sary supplies and equipment and to keep constant tab on the an-
ticipated need so that immediate action may be taken to fill it.
The intelligence officer has the duty of keeping the com-
mander fully informed of the riot situation. He defines and
measures the field problem and reports to the commander so that
an evaluation of the field problem can be compiled. The operations
officer utilizes the intelligence gained to develop the strategy for
the control of the riot. It is his responsibility to advise the field
commander in regard to proposed strategy and to keep constantly
abreast of the progress of the mission in the field and to measure
it against the strategy of tactics which has been approved. The
public information officer is charged with the responsibility of
keeping the press advised of all developments, and in this way
removing much of the pressure that would otherwise be exerted on
the field commander, while at the same time assuring that the
public is fully advised of the situation.
SPECIALIZATION
The use of such a command structure has proved the most
effective command organization, for it stresses specialization and
maximum utilization of special ability. But the designation of
responsibility is not enough. Recent history has taught that it is
essential to unify command at central locations. This is particularly
true in a major disturbance when city, county, and state units are
all involved in the action. If each agency establishes separate com-
mand posts, there will be a breakdown in communications and
exchange of intelligence, duplication of effort, conflicting
policy statements, waste of time and resulting confusion. This is ag-
gravated if political antagonism exists between the various leaders,
for the lack of communication will give rise to suspicion and petty
jealousy. It cannot be overly stressed that in times of emergency
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the first consideration must be the restoration of law and order.
There is no place for personal aggrandizement at the expense of
society.
In disaster situations two command centers will be established:
1) Emergency control headquarters; 2) Field command post. The
chief or his delegated representative is in charge of the emergency
control headquarters, while the field commander is in command of
the field command post.
The emergency control headquarters will usually be estab-
lished at police headquarters, as it is the best equipped to serve as
the center of operations. The command post should be established
at or near the location of the disturbance, to provide control, co-
ordination and communications. It will be the control center for
the entire operation. Through it passes all information, including
the assignment of officers, equipment and any other directions nec-
essary to coordinate the efforts of those men involved in a particular
police problem. A command post may be established by a super-
visory officer when in his judgment the circumstances surrounding
the situation require a base for radio communication or direct com-
mand control. Headquarters must be advised of the exact location
of temporary headquarters and all telephone and other communi-
cation facilities available for use at the scene.
In a large operation, in addition to the command post estab-
lished by the commander, each subordinate scene commander may
establish a field post. The activities of each particular branch will
be controlled from this field post. However, no independent action
should be instituted without notification to the command post.
The subordinate commanders shall assign a superior officer to the
command post to maintain liaison. A list of potential field posts
based on a survey of possible trouble areas should be compiled in
advance of any emergency. Plans should be developed for the estab-
lishment of a command post and for the staffing and equipping of
the command post, in time of need, with a minimum of delay.
MOBILE COMMAND POST
At times, a mobile command post may be used. Its great ad-
vantage is its mobility, which allows flexibility in response to a fluid
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mob situation. Likewise, because such a command post is fully
equipped, no time is lost in setting up and establishing the neces-
sary communication outlets. It can be any type vehicle. Surplus
military trailers, large trucks, converted buses, and similar units
have been developed around their local availability and low orig-
inal acquisition costs.
If the department is starting from scratch to set up a mobile
command center, it is recommended that a truck-trailer unit be
acquired. This enables all of the permanent installations to be
installed in the trailer unit. The truck unit can then be "exercised"
at regular intervals, since vehicles and motors deteriorate when
standing inactive. Over a period of years this will prove to be the
most economical and efficient system.
The internal arrangement of the command posts should be
such as to afford the staff maximum working facilities consistent
with requirements for security and mobility. To save time and
effort and to facilitate coordination, staff sections having closely
related activities should be grouped in the same locality. Sections
which have numerous visitors or which process a large volume of
messages should be located near an entrance to the building or
area. Sections handling considerable classified material need the
protection of a location away from main entrances.
The center of the command post is the war room. It is pri-
marily an orientation, briefing and conference room. In a tactical
headquarters, it may also serve as the combined operations room.
The purpose of a war room is to provide a single location within
the headquarters in which the commander and chief of staff may
familiarize themselves with the entire situation as it pertains to the
command. It also provides a location where the commander or ex-
ecutive can assemble staff officers or commanders to provide them
with all available information concerning the current situation.
Another important use is to provide a centralized location where
certain designated liaison officers may secure the latest information
on the situation without disturbing the staff sections.
COMMUNICATION CENTER
A communication center where all of the communication
equipment is established should be close to the war room. It should
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be equipped with radio transmitters capable of contacting all the
various units that may be committed, teletype, and telephones.
All information concerning the operation must be expeditiously
transmitted to the command post, so that the commander may be
cognizant of the current situation. This is essential so that an evalu-
ation of the conditions present may be made, and necessary orders
issued.
The public relations officer should establish an area in which
the representatives of news media can be regularly briefed on the
latest developments. Situation maps should be maintained for their
convenience. A comprehensive, consolidated summary of informa-
tion must be maintained and supplied to other interested agency
heads so as to give them an accurate, current digest of the situation
that will permit them to take further appropriate action as re-
quired.
The command post should be placed under guard and have
available to it several areas of approach and exit. Road blocks
should be used to seal it off and these should be manned by officers
in sufficient numbers and armed with the necessary weapons to
secure it completely from mob or public interference. This is nec-
essary to prevent raids and also to prevent blockades of streets and
avenues of exit and approach. Police headquarters and units lo-
cated in the center of the city, where narrow streets are common,
are especially vulnerable to a planned roadblock. Many times a
single stalled vehicle or a staged collision at one or more critical
intersections near the police headquarters will be sufficient to block
movement of police vehicles to trouble areas. This is a tactic that
can be expected in conjunction with any professionally organized
riot action and must be foreseen and protected against. Fires, ex-
plosives, bomb scares, organized demonstrations, and similar ob-
struction tactics may also be employed.
A perimeter guard should be set up so that the commander
and his staff will be isolated and not interfered with in any way.
A pass system should be initiated so that only authorized personnel
will be allowed into the post. It is no place for curious sightseers
who have no function and whose presence will merely complicate
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and confuse the situation. A log should be kept of all those who
enter and leave the post.
MANPOWER
The next major problem is manpower. One thing that has
been learned in recent riots is the need for tremendous amounts of
manpower, and by this we do not mean merely a mass of men. We
mean trained efficient police officers who are capable of coping with
the very difficult problem that will confront them in the field. In
fact, it should be emphasized that untrained personnel should not
be used in field operations. Such units, if they are utilized, can be
assigned to policing other sections of the community, thus relieving
experienced personnel for riot duty.
Plans should be formulated for mobilization of both the
regular and auxiliary or reserve forces. They should include:
1. A listing of personnel designated for riot control assign-
ments. Such listing should include information concerning their
duty assignment (location and shift), their residence address and
telephone number.
2. A system of notification for personnel.
3. A plan for transporting personnel to the trouble area.
4. A program for periodic briefing of personnel concerning
the specific assignments.
5. Information concerning the identity of personnel trained
with the type of riot control training specifically set forth. It is im-
portant that individuals with technical training (communications,
photography, etc.) should be listed.
6. Dispersal of reserve personnel and equipment to assembly
areas outside the potential critical areas.
7. Sources of reinforcement. Special categories of personnel
such as doctors, nurses, ambulance attendants, dog and horse
trainers, aircraft pilots, armored vehicle drivers, and boat operators.
The first step in any manpower plan is to determine the per-
sonnel requirements. The number of police personnel required
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should be based on an analysis of intelligence reports, reconnais-
sance, previous similar events, number or magnitude of potential
problem areas, and information by sponsors of the event. Such
flexibility is gained by establishing various degrees of mobilization.
ORGANIZATION
It is desirable in advance of any trouble to organize on each
shift, and to designate leaders. By having the group leader and his
group selected from the same shift, they are more easily and quickly
called in for action. There is a definite advantage to having these
men in groups. It allows the commander to hold units in different
degrees of readiness. One may be in reserve, one on standby, and
still another on alert. The commander also can call out any one of
the groups without having all of them report. One entire shift can
also be held over after duty hours without complete groups con-
tained within the shift being broken.
Keep the group reporting as a unit during emergency opera-
tion so that a minimum loss of time in special assignments will be
experienced. The commanding officer can do his work much faster
if he can issue orders for a unit to the group leader. He is thus
relieved of the task of assigning specific tasks to everybody. He and
his men can get much more work done in a shorter time.
There must also be a plan to recall off-duty officers for assign-
ment to the area of tension or to man those districts or beats left
unattended by those sent to the mob or riot area. There are several
ways to do this. To cancel vacations and days off will add consider-
ably to the force. To activate two 12-hour duty shifts and divide the
men between just these two shifts will further increase the force,
but that just about ends the potential of the police department.
To simplify the division of the department personnel for 12-hour
duty shifts, it is better to concentrate only on the division and reas-
signment of one of the three shifts into the remaining two shifts.
A police department would do well to establish as a part of its
routine procedures an emergency call list whereby off-duty police-
men could be returned to duty as rapidly as possible. To preserve
the energy of the police, it is well to establish degrees of call up.
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The first is the "alert." The police are notified of the emergency
and told to hold themselves in readiness. "Standby" requires the
police to be dressed, equipped and ready to move if called. "Re-
serve" demands that the officer report to the designated reserve
center to await commitment to action.
Periodically and at unannounced times, test alerts should be
conducted on order of the police chief. When this type alert is in-
volved, nothing further than completion of notification by tele-
phone and execution of the form is necessary; physical response to
a location is not required.
When a riot occurs, the police must respond immediately. To
do so, they must have a specific plan of action. They must rapidly
execute that plan. They must be firm in the execution of the plan.
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
The basic tactical principles are to arrest the leaders and de-
stroy the command structure of the rioters, break up the mob and
prevent it from regrouping. The first step taken by the police in
such a situation is to isolate the area of the disturbance. This is
done by establishing a cordon around the critical zone, the area of
the actual disturbance. In turn the critical zone is surrounded by an
isolation zone, which is a buffer, and at the same time the area in
which police forces are organized and in which the various police
command posts are established.
The purpose of such isolation is twofold: one, to diminish the
size of the mob by allowing those members of it who wish to escape
to do so, while at the same time preventing reinforcements from
swelling the size of the mob; second, by restricting the activities of
the mob to the critical area, you protect other portions of the metro-
politan area.
But the police must do more than merely isolate the area and
allow the riot to burn itself out. They must take measures to protect
the citizens in the riot zone. 'they must protect the thousands of
helpless law abiding citizens who live, work, or are in the riot area.
This is a lesson that has been learned at a very dear price. The
police cannot withdraw from any area in our community. There
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are those who claimed that the police uniform antagonized the
citizens of Watts. They promised that peace would be restored if
only the hated police uniform were withdrawn from the danger
area. This was not true. This is never true. The withdrawal of the
uniform was in effect a visual withdrawal of authority and a signal
for anarchy to prevail, for the mob to take over and do as it would.
This has been the case whenever the police have for any reason
failed to perform the functions with which they are charged, have
failed to give the people of the community the protection and secu-
rity to which they are entitled.
In this respect it is my personal recommendation that when a
riot breaks out in a commercial area, police units should be im-
mediately rushed into the heart of that area to seal it off and secure
the entire commercial area. Rather than merely encircling it and
slowly marching units into it, a convoy of cars and trucks can sweep
from one end of the business section to the other, dropping off pro-
tective bodies of police squads along the route of travel to establish
control. This will save the commercial centers.
This latter tactic of rapid dispersal is particularly applicable in
those instances where the mob resorts to the use of guerrilla tactics.
Recent riots have shown that the rioters no longer follow the classic
pattern of massing together in a mob and moving toward an ob-
jective. Rather, they have adopted the technique of a guerrilla
attack. They attack, disperse, re-group and re-attack. They hit those
areas where there is insufficient manpower to restrain them. They
avoid any direct attack with the police if at all possible.
Unfortunately, within the last few years, this country has been
flooded with propaganda advocating violence, instructing citizens
on how to construct Molotov cocktails and acid bombs, how and
where to most effectively attack the police. This propaganda has
not gone unnoticed, which means that the problem of combating
the rioters will be magnified in the future, for there is every reason
to believe that they will have leadership, direction and technical
knowledge, if not actual battle training.
TYPES OF RIOTS
In dealing with the guerrilla type of riot, the police must
saturate the affected area with manpower, break up any communi-
RIOT PREVENTION AND SURVIVAL
cations which may exist between the rioters and the command cen-
ter for the rioters, and establish protective forces around all critical
centers in the riot areas. The police must match force with greater
force, but most of all, with dedication, the same dedication that
motivates their everyday performance of their duty.
In dealing with the large classic type of mob, personal appeals
to the members of the group by those in whom they have respect
and to whom they look for leadership should be made. In these
appeals the members of the mob should be requested to disband
and to desist from any further mob activity.
The next step is the "show force." This is nothing more nor
less than the display of law enforcement units equipped and ready
to engage the mob. The purpose is to convince the mob of the
ability of the police to maintain law and order and to disperse the
mob with physical force if necessary. If the mob is so persuaded, it
will disperse. If it does not, the next step is for the commander of
the police force to give the order to disperse, but such an order
should not be given until the commander has sufficient force to
back up his order.
Needless to say, it is essential that an area into which the
rioters are to be dispersed has been selected and that the roads to
that are cleared of all obstructions so that the mob will have an
area of escape. The mob should be informed of these routes.
If the mob still refuses to disperse, it will be necessary for the
police to use force to disperse the mob. The police units will be
moved against the mob in various standard formations. The selec-
tion of the appropriate one will depend upon the object to be ac-
complished. But, before you move, apprehend and remove the
mob's leaders, for without leadership the mob will more readily
disintegrate.
The amount of force that should be used should be no greater
than necessary, for it is not the object of the police to inflict injury
upon rioters but to maintain peace and order and to protect the
members of society. Firearms should only be employed in self-pro-
tection, and when they are employed, they should be used with
the intent of disabling the target. Therefore, if the police are sub-
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ject to sniper fire, they should protect themselves by employing
counter snipers, who concentrate their fire upon the snipers.
Let us assume that the mob has been put on the run. Once
this occurs, keep it on the run and make sure it doesn't have an
opportunity to reassemble. Patrol the affected area and maintain
guards at crucial points which may be targets for the mob. Maintain
the patrols as long as necessary to insure that there will be no reoc-
currence of the mob. In instances this may require control for
periods of several days.
I have very briefly touched some of the highlights. The control
of riots is a very complex matter, one that taxes all of the resources
and resourcefulness of law enforcement.
You must also do your part to restore stability in your com-
munity and to aid those injured by the disorder. You must address
yourself and your community to the greater task of making this a
better society. Lincoln gave us the answer over a century ago when
he declared:
Let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other
man, this race and that race and the other race being inferior,
and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position.
Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people
throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up declar-
ing that all men are created equal.
It is not an easy task. But it can be done. It must be donel
